вопрос

george_gl

Народ может кто подскажет. В общем после первой мировой войны в США была создана комиссия по изучению опыта войны и разработке рекомендаций по артиллерии. Фамилия её руководителя вроде на Б начиналась. Не даст ли кто ссылку на русском на текст её доклада.
Раньше многие на неё ссылались

Слоняра

То что есть


The Westervelt Hoard
Para. 142. A Board of Officers to consist of Brig Gens William I. Westervelt. Robert E. Callan. William P. Knnis. Cols James B. Dillard. Ralph McT. Pencil, and Lt Cols Webster A. Capron and Waller P. Boatwright. US Army, is appointed to meet at ЛРО 706. France, at the earliest practicable date, to make a study of the armament, calibers ami types of materiel, kinds and proportions of ammunition and methods of transport of the artillery to be assigned to a Field Army... By order of the Secretary of War. Peyton C. March. General. Chief of Stall.
(Extract from US Army Special Order 289-0, II December 1918.)
This special order was the genesis of the "Caliber Board", as it was called at the lime, or the 'Westervelt Board", as it eventually came to he known. It was a well-selected board. Of these officers. Westervelt became Chief of Stall.

Boatwright Chief of Artillery, and the others distinguished themselves equally in their various fields. They assembled at Chaumont on 12 January 1919. visited French. Italian and British headquarters and ordnance factories, returned to the USA to visit factories and artillery establishments, and submitted their report on 5 May 1919. The report runs to thirty-eight pages and there is scarcely one superfluous word. First, the report considered what the artillery of a field army was supposed to do. then it laid out an organization capable of doing it. and then it detailed exactly what sort of weapons were needed to do it.
The Westervelt Board uas convened so that the development of the field artillery arm over the next twenty years could be planned. The US Army's field artillery had been a minority arm until 1917. It then had to undergo massive expansion, and in doing so found that its equipment was not capable, in terms of both quantity and quality, of providing the support the army needed. As a result, all but a handful of its guns were provided by Britain and France, and its artillery doctrines were almost entirely dictated by the French Army.
Once the war was over, the US Held artillery set about taking control of its own affairs: prior to 1917. it had such minor status that the Ordnance Department told it what guns it was going to have, and Infantry told it what to do with them. The wartime expansion gave it a Chief of Artillery.


General Snow, with sufficient clout to argue for it in
Washington.
Regarding equipment, the board reached the conclusion that what was needed was a light gun of about 3in/75mm calibre, firing a 151b (6.8kg) shell to 11.000 yards (10,090m), backed up by a howitzer of about 4in/105mm calibre firing a 25- to 301b (11.35-13.65kg) shell to a range in excess of 10.000 yards (9.200m). A 'medium field gun" with a calibre somewhere between three and six inches was also considered necessary, the board pointing to the British 60-pounder and similar French and German weapons. Fora medium field howit/er. the French 155mm Schneider was considered perfectly satisfactory, and it continued in service as the M1917. A heavy field gun of about 6in and a heavy howitzer of about 9.5in were next on the list of requirements, which ended with four major-calibre support weapons: an Sin gun tiring to 35.000 yards (32.110m): a Kin gun firing to 40.000 yards (36,700m); a 12in howitzer firing to 25.000 yards (22.940m): and a 16in howitzer with a range not less than 27.000 yards (22.770m). This latter group were all to be mounted on railway carriages.
The light field equipments were then considered in more detail. The "ideal solution' for the howitzer was described as follows: "A weapon of about 105mm caliber on a carriage permitting a vertical arc of fire from minus 5 degrees to plus 65 degrees, and a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees. The projectile should weigh about 30 to 35 pounds and should include shrapnel and shell. A maximum range of 12.000 yards will be satisfactory. Semifixed ammunition and zone charges should be used."
For the light field gun they requested "a gun of about 3in caliber on a carriage permitting a vertical arc of fire of from minus 5 degrees to plus 80 degrees and a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees: a projectile weighing not over 20 pounds, shrapnel and high explosive shell: fixed ammunition: smokeless, flashless propelling charge: time fuze for shrapnel: bore-safe, super-quick and selective delay fuze for shell. . . Two propelling charges should be furnished, a normal charge for about

11.000 yards range and a super-charge for maximum range. A maximum rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute is deemed sufficient.'
These were the ideal solutions. The 'practical' solutions were simple - continue to use the war's leftovers until the research departments came up with the ideals - and that was exactly what happened.
Both the light field gun and the howitzer were to have "a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees", and the gun was to have a maximum elevation of 80 degrees, whereas the howitzer would only reach 65 degrees. As far as the howitzer was concerned, the 360-degree part was fairly rapidlj abandoned, since it must have become obvious that a carriage capable of all-round fire would be excessively heavy in that calibre.
The two figures quoted for the gun gave rise to a long and fruitless pursuit of the all-purpose gun. the "75mm Light Divisional Gun'. This had a three-legged trail carrying a pedestal-mounted 75mm gun with a very long barrel: the general effect was an anti-aircraft gun capable of operating in the ground role rather than a field gun capable of anti-aircraft fire. It is not clear exactly when and why this idea was finally knocked on the head: it was certainly being illustrated in military magazines in 1935. but in 1938. Hayes" Elements of Ordnance, the official West Point text on artillery, said "the so-called all-purpose mounts, designed for several classes of fire requiring several types of materiel, have not proved successful or practicable." This seems to suggest that the light divisional gun had been abandoned.
However, while this wild goose chase was in progress, a great deal of more substantial work had been done.

george_gl

Спасибо Слоняра именно комиссию Westerveltа
я имел ввиду, но к сожалению это на англицком и вроде текста там должно быть гораздо больше.
Но всё равно спасибо, может в рунете и нет, гугл не нашёл

Слоняра

На русском текста я не видел, на английском описательно часто.
Вот здесь не он лежит? http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA951851